from KELVIN JAKACHIRA in Goma, DRC
GOMA, (CAJ News) – THE Washington Accords between Rwanda and the DRC were presented as a major diplomatic achievement in the Great Lakes region.
Yet less than six months later, the deal is showing signs of serious strain. Washington’s muted response to President Félix Tshisekedi’s actions has increasingly been interpreted by his inner circle as tacit approval.
Convinced that Congo’s strategic mineral wealth gives his government significant leverage, Tshisekedi now appears to be pursuing two dangerous paths simultaneously: a controversial push for a third presidential term and an escalating military campaign in eastern Congo that could reignite a wider regional conflict.
The political crisis now gripping Kinshasa is entirely the result of domestic decisions.
On May 5, 2026, President Tshisekedi signalled support for a constitutional referendum that could open the door to a third term, despite the Congolese Constitution’s clear two-term limit.
In response, opposition figures, including Martin Fayulu, Moïse Katumbi and Delly Sessanga, formed a coalition known as C64, named after Article 64 of the Constitution, which affirms citizens’ right to resist unconstitutional seizures of power. The coalition has pledged to oppose any effort to amend the constitutional order.
So far, however, the US and other international partners have responded cautiously to these developments. That restraint risks being interpreted in Kinshasa as a sign that there will be few consequences, if any, for a hardline approach.
If peaceful demonstrations by the opposition are met with force, the country could see a repeat of past violence.
The events of 11 December 2024, when members of the Republican Guard killed at least 56 people and injured over 80 in Goma, remain a stark reminder of how violently dissent is dealt with in the country.
On the security front, the situation is equally fragile. Government military operations have intensified in parts of South Kivu, particularly against Banyamulenge villages in the High Plateau of Minembwe.
This is despite the fact that the AFC/M23 Movement recently withdrew from the Rusizi Plain in a de-escalatory move near the Burundian border. Regrettably, Kinshasa coalition forces reportedly reinforced their positions in the area instead of reciprocating.
Worse still, there are growing concerns that Kinshasa may be preparing new offensives aimed at retaking Goma and Bukavu.
Those fears were reinforced by comments from Professor Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, the civilian governor of South Kivu, who stated in January 2026 that he carried a message from President Tshisekedi that the two cities would be retaken soon.
Perceptions of imbalance in Washington’s approach are contributing to the problem. The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project recently observed that Kinshasa appears unwilling to make any concessions to the M23 at this point.
Critics argue that by placing greater pressure on Kigali while remaining comparatively mute towards Kinshasa’s transgressions, Washington risks reinforcing the belief within the Congolese government that it can pursue military escalation without jeopardising US support.
At the same time, several commitments made during the Doha peace process remain unfulfilled. These include repeated ceasefire violations and a refusal to honour a prisoner exchange agreed upon as a trust-building measure.
The regional dimension of the conflict further complicates matters. US officials have expressed concern that M23 presence near the Burundian border could spark a broader war.
But they have not expressed the same concern about Burundi’s continued deployment in support of Kinshasa’s ongoing offensives against the M23 rebels.
Unless Burundi faces sustained diplomatic pressure to support the peace process, the current fragile détente may not hold.
For Rwanda, the prospect of the FDLR redeploying closer to its border remains a red line. Yet this is what any large-scale military offensive against M23-controlled areas could create.
Whether or not one accepts Rwanda’s broader justification for intervention, ignoring those security concerns while simultaneously demanding restraint from Kigali risks increasing the chances of a direct interstate confrontation.
To be sure, constitutional reform is ultimately a sovereign issue for the Congolese people. But the US assumed a central diplomatic role in the crisis at President Tshisekedi’s request. That role carries responsibilities as well as influence.
If Washington hopes to preserve the agreement it helped negotiate, it cannot limit its engagement to only one side of the conflict.
It must find a way to rein in Tshisekedi’s political ambitions and military brinkmanship. And the US has incentives to do so.
After all, the US–Congo strategic partnership, particularly around critical minerals, will ultimately depend on long-term stability. No American investor will enjoy the fruits of this partnership if the country and the region are burning.
The Trump administration still has a narrow opportunity to stabilise the peace process. That will require clear and consistent pressure on all parties, including Kinshasa, to respect constitutional norms, uphold the ceasefire and avoid actions that inflame ethnic and regional tensions.
– CAJ News