from LIONEL MANZI in Kinshasa, DRC
DRC Bureau
KINSHASA, (CAJ News) – THE Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is drifting towards a dangerous precipice, and far too few seem willing to acknowledge it.
By arming violent militias, the government in Kinshasa is setting the country on a path that bears an unsettling resemblance to Sudan’s recent history.
Anyone concerned about stability in the Great Lakes region should recognise this for what it is: a slow-burning crisis that risks spiralling out of control.
Almost two months ago, former president Joseph Kabila sounded the alarm in an interview with *La Libre Afrique*, describing what is happening in his country as “Sudanisation”.
On this point, at least, he is right. The parallels are difficult to ignore. Faced with rebellion and unable to assert full control over its territory, the state has turned to militias, often mobilised along ethnic lines, to fill the gaps. This is presented as a pragmatic solution. In reality, it is a deeply short-sighted gamble. Sudan learned this the hard way; the Congo should have known better.
Once armed and legitimised, these groups rarely remain instruments of the state for long. They develop their own interests, loyalties and agendas.
They commit widespread abuses, some carrying the hallmarks of targeted ethnic violence, which only fuels further mobilisation. More communities arm themselves in response.
The result is a fragmented landscape in which authority is dispersed among hundreds of armed actors.
In eastern Congo, this is already the reality, with a patchwork of militias, local defence groups and warlords competing for power.
Yet even the supposed allies in the fight against M23 do not operate in harmony.
Clashes between the Congolese army and militias grouped under the Wazalendo banner have become increasingly common.
The “enemy of my enemy” logic quickly unravels when there is no coherent command structure or shared cause beyond hostility towards the designated “Tutsi” foe.
What emerges instead is a steady erosion of state authority, with the risk that the state itself begins to fracture.
Sudan offers a sobering example of where this trajectory can lead. The country’s reliance on paramilitary forces ultimately contributed to its fragmentation.
South Sudan’s secession was one consequence. The violence in Darfur was another warning sign of what happens when armed groups operate beyond effective state control.
In time, rivalries between powerful generals turned these forces into proxies in a brutal power struggle. The result is the devastation Sudan faces today.
Congo risks repeating these mistakes. While the Wazalendo are presented as reserve forces supporting the army, in practice many answer to local power brokers whose allegiance to the state is conditional and transactional. Without a serious effort to disband these groups, the country will remain trapped in a cycle of militarisation and instability.
International efforts to reverse this trend have faltered. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes once supported by the United Nations peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, have effectively been reversed. Rather than winding down, MONUSCO risks becoming a permanent fixture as insecurity worsens.
Against this backdrop, the recent proposal to establish yet another paramilitary force, reportedly funded by external partners such as the UAE to protect mining sites, is deeply troubling. The rationale is revealing: existing security forces are not trusted to safeguard mining interests. Creating a new, better-equipped force to do so may reassure investors, but it further fragments the security apparatus. It raises the prospect of an armed entity whose primary accountability lies not with the Congolese state, but with its foreign backers.
Here again, the comparison with Sudan is instructive. State fragmentation unfolds gradually, as authority weakens and competing centres of power emerge.
In Congo, signs of this process are already visible. Calls for greater autonomy in the east are growing louder, driven by a sense that political solutions are increasingly out of reach. If rival factions within the state begin using different armed groups to pursue their interests, the risk of a wider internal rupture becomes very real.
Congo is not doomed to follow this path, but it is undeniably heading in that direction. The warning signs are there for anyone willing to see them.
Allowing the current trajectory to continue unchecked would represent a profound failure — not only for Congo, but for the region as a whole, and indeed for the African continent.
– CAJ News